



The Private Markets in a Downturn

By Mario Giannini, CEO | April 30, 2020

At the time of this writing, it will have been almost five full months since the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed in Wuhan, China in mid-November. Four months later, on March 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared it a global pandemic. Two days prior to that declaration, market-wide circuit breakers were triggered for the first time in 20 years. The markets have been on a wild, and generally downward, ride since. And just last week, on April 20, oil prices dropped into negative territory for the first time ever.

That's a lot to digest, particularly over the span of just a few short months. Suffice it to say (though it feels almost trite to actually say it), the COVID-19 pandemic has had – and will continue to have – a profound impact not only on the global economy, but across every facet of our lives. While people around the world are attempting to adjust to the “new normal” of social distancing and self-quarantining, for investors, the market downturn is a worrisome concern piled atop a heap of other unknowns.

As investors around the world seek to get a handle on this latest downturn and implications for their portfolios, we are reprising an excerpt from our latest [Market Overview](#), from the Fall of 2019, in which we offer some considerations as to why the private markets (perhaps unsurprisingly) are generally well-prepared to withstand a downturn. Keep in mind that these thoughts were published prior to the current global health crisis.

We are in an odd spot, aren't we? There is an uncomfortable likelihood that we are facing the first real downturn that major economies have experienced in 12 years. Yet, looking at several of the private market indicators, we don't see peak behavior. We don't have money being spent by general partners at frenzied levels. We don't see limited partners chasing down allocation targets by committing vast amounts of capital.





So, what do we make of that? We make of it that the private markets are entering this downturn, if it actually comes to pass, in far better shape than they entered the 2000 and 2008 downturns. That’s a very good thing. The silver lining, as it were. What has us convinced that the private markets are in better shape? We’ve already touched upon a number of reasons:

- » Money has been coming back to limited partners in buckets (another technical term of measurement used in the private markets);
- » General partners have exhibited none of the signs of greed with respect to the pace of investing that occurred in prior cycles; and
- » Limited partners have not thrown gobs of money at funds, causing fundraising to spike to record levels.

Sure, co-investments are scary and multiples are high, but that is all manageable and probably confined to

individual companies and LP portfolios. It does not appear to be a systemic risk as we saw in 2000 and 2008.

But let’s come back to the larger question at hand. What if there is no downturn? What if we’re still on the runway to a peak, but, assuming a downturn is bearing down upon us, we make bad decisions and become our own worst enemies? We’ve seen from prior cycle behavior that private markets practitioners have a propensity to act as irrationally and emotionally as those in the public markets. How do we prepare for an environment that is either ready to turn down or not at all? How do we choose transactions or general partners in this environment? Where should we focus our efforts and our portfolios?

Observations from prior paths to peaks provide some guidance. (Sigh, alliteration makes everything sound better. Remember Bowie’s brilliant, “wish upon, wish upon, day upon day”?)


GP’s (lack of) Greed

Another sentiment indicator, and one of our favorites for its indication of the collective greed on general partners’ parts, is in firmly neutral territory (Chart 63).

If we were at a market peak, you’d really expect that some part of the private markets universe would be spending quickly. None is.

Chart 63: Time Between Fund Strategy

Median Time to Next Fund in Years




Source: Hamilton Lane Data (October 2019)



Capital overhang

Chart 31: Time to Deploy Capital Overhang

Years at LTM Pace




Source: Hamilton Lane Data (October 2019)

Now turn your attention to Chart 31, which, in our humble opinion, is really how we should be looking at the capital overhang. At current rates of investment, how much time will it take to spend the capital? We are right around average levels in all strategies other than venture, which, interestingly, suggests that more capital needs to go into that area. The other fascinating aspect of this chart is that the best times to invest are when the capital overhang is at its greatest. How is that for counterintuitive?

It's one of life's great paradoxes. It's largely because investment activity slows down in difficult times as sellers don't want to sell at low prices until they get used to those prices. Reality takes a long time to re-calibrate. Hell, in the case of the investors' view of the significance of the capital overhang, we're at 10 years and counting.

Moving on from the capital overhang, what's the rate of spending out there? (Chart 32)

Chart 32: Annual Private Markets Contributions



Source: Hamilton Lane Data via Cobalt (October 2019)

While the absolute pace of investing is high, that's only because the entire industry has grown. On a relative basis, investments have been at about average levels in the private equity world. Perhaps surprisingly, particularly given the press around the credit space,

the pace of investing has been light in both credit and real assets. Why? The explanation is not unlike what we said about limited partners in the context of their fund commitment pacing: General partners have been relatively disciplined about investing during this entire




cycle. We have not seen the kind of exuberant behavior that took place at prior peaks in 2000 and 2007. If we are at a peak, if there is the beast of recession readying

to jump out at us, then we would argue that private markets portfolios will be in far better shape than they were in the prior two downturns.

Fundraising:

Chart 22: Global Private Markets Fundraising



Source: Bison Data via Cobalt, Preqin, Bloomberg (October 2019)

If you're not going to cry for Eva Perón, then please don't cry for fund managers. Funds continue to gather substantial amounts of capital. Somewhat surprisingly, the numbers appear to have peaked, hovering around the same levels for the last few years (Chart 22). Why is that? One reason, we believe, is that the transaction volume is soaking up some of the capital that would

otherwise, or formerly, have gone into funds. Another reason, again perhaps surprisingly, is that limited partners are exercising discipline around capital deployment. We're not observing the kinds of massive fundraising increases that characterized the run-up to the 2007 peak. That is an extremely positive, and overlooked, aspect of the current market environment.

Conclusion

There you have it. What has us convinced that the private markets may be in better shape this time around? To recap (and with the dual caveat and reminder that the world looks and feels very different just a few months later): Money has been coming back to limited partners. General partners have not shown any of the signs of greed with respect to the pace of investing that occurred in prior cycles, and limited partners have exhibited discipline in their commitment levels, preventing fundraising from spiking to record levels. So while there are plenty of reasons to be kept up at night, let's take a collective deep breath and attempt to acknowledge the ways in which the private markets may be well-prepared for this downturn.



Index Definitions:

MSCI World Index – The MSCI World Index tracks large and mid-cap equity performance in developed market countries.

Strategy Definitions:

All Private Markets – Hamilton Lane's definition of "All Private Markets" includes all private commingled funds excluding fund-of-funds, and secondary fund-of-funds.

Corporate Finance/Buyout – Any PE fund that generally takes a control position by buying a company.

Credit – This strategy focuses on providing debt capital.

Mega/Large Buyout – Any buyout fund larger than a certain fund size that depends on the vintage year.

Private Equity – A broad term used to describe any fund that offers equity capital to private companies.

Real Assets – Real Assets includes any PE fund with a strategy of either Infrastructure or Natural Resources. Real Estate funds are not included.

VC/Growth – Includes all funds with a strategy of venture capital or growth equity.

Venture Capital – Venture capital includes any All Private Markets funds focused on any stages of venture capital investing, including seed, early-stage, mid-stage, and late-stage investments.

This presentation has been prepared solely for informational purposes and contains confidential and proprietary information, the disclosure of which could be harmful to Hamilton Lane. Accordingly, the recipients of this presentation are requested to maintain the confidentiality of the information contained herein. This presentation may not be copied or distributed, in whole or in part, without the prior written consent of Hamilton Lane.

The information contained in this presentation may include forward-looking statements regarding returns, performance, opinions, the fund presented or its portfolio companies, or other events contained herein. Forward-looking statements include a number of risks, uncertainties and other factors beyond our control, or the control of the fund or the portfolio companies, which may result in material differences in actual results, performance or other expectations. The opinions, estimates and analyses reflect our current judgment, which may change in the future.

All opinions, estimates and forecasts of future performance or other events contained herein are based on information available to Hamilton Lane as of the date of this presentation and are subject to change. Past performance of the investments described herein is not indicative of future results. In addition, nothing contained herein shall be deemed to be a prediction of future performance. The information included in this presentation has not been reviewed or audited by independent public accountants. Certain information included herein has been obtained from sources that Hamilton Lane believes to be reliable, but the accuracy of such information cannot be guaranteed.

This presentation is not an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, any security or to enter into any agreement with Hamilton Lane or any of its affiliates. Any such offering will be made only at your request. We do not intend that any public offering will be made by us at any time with respect to any potential transaction discussed in this presentation. Any offering or potential transaction will be made pursuant to separate documentation negotiated between us, which will supersede entirely the information contained herein.

Certain of the performance results included herein do not reflect the deduction of any applicable advisory or management fees, since it is not possible to allocate such fees accurately in a vintage year presentation or in a composite measured at different points in time. A client's rate of return will be reduced by any applicable advisory or management fees, carried interest and any expenses incurred. Hamilton Lane's fees are described in Part 2 of our Form ADV, a copy of which is available upon request.

The following hypothetical example illustrates the effect of fees on earned returns for both separate accounts and fund-of-funds investment vehicles. The example is solely for illustration purposes and is not intended as a guarantee or prediction of the actual returns that would be earned by similar investment vehicles having comparable features. The example is as follows: The hypothetical separate account or fund-of-funds consisted of \$100 million in commitments with a fee structure of 1.0% on committed capital during the first four years of the term of the investment and then declining by 10% per year thereafter for the 12-year life of the account. The commitments were made during the first three years in relatively equal increments and the assumption of returns was based on cash flow assumptions derived from a historical database of actual private equity cash flows. Hamilton Lane modeled the impact of fees on four different return streams over a 12-year time period. In these examples, the effect of the fees reduced returns by approximately 2%. This does not include performance fees, since the performance of the account would determine the effect such fees would have on returns. Expenses also vary based on the particular investment vehicle and, therefore, were not included in this hypothetical example. Both performance fees and expenses would further decrease the return.

Hamilton Lane (UK) Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hamilton Lane Advisors, L.L.C. Hamilton Lane (UK) Limited is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conducts Authority. In the UK this communication is directed solely at persons who would be classified as a professional client or eligible counterparty under the FCA Handbook of Rules and Guidance. Its contents are not directed at, may not be suitable for and should not be relied upon by retail clients.

Hamilton Lane Advisors, L.L.C. is exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence under the Corporations Act 2001 in respect of the financial services by operation of ASIC Class Order 03/1100: U.S. SEC regulated financial service providers. Hamilton Lane Advisors, L.L.C. is regulated by the SEC under U.S. laws, which differ from Australian laws.

Any tables, graphs or charts relating to past performance included in this presentation are intended only to illustrate the performance of the indices, composites, specific accounts or funds referred to for the historical periods shown. Such tables, graphs and charts are not intended to predict future performance and should not be used as the basis for an investment decision.

The information herein is not intended to provide, and should not be relied upon for, accounting, legal or tax advice, or investment recommendations. You should consult your accounting, legal, tax or other advisors about the matters discussed herein.

The calculations contained in this document are made by Hamilton Lane based on information provided by the general partner (e.g. cash flows and valuations), and have not been prepared, reviewed or approved by the general partners.

As of April 27, 2020